The value of a statistical life (VSL) is a critical driver of estimated benefits for federal policies designed to improve human health, safety, and environmental exposures. The vast majority of empirical evidence on the magnitude of the VSL arises from hedonic wage models that have been plagued by measurement error and omitted variables. This paper employs randomly assigned workplace safety inspections to instrument for plant-level risks in a quasiexperimental design to address these limitations. We provide credible causal evidence for the existence of compensating wages for fatality risks and estimate a VSL between $8 and $10 million ($2016).
This research exploits randomized workplace safety inspections to identify compensating wage differentials for risky working conditions and provide credibly identified estimates of the "value of a statistical life" (VSL). The VSL is an aggregate measure of individual marginal willingness to pay for risk reductions and it is most commonly estimated with hedonic wage models. 1 Despite decades of empirical research, the credibility of VSL estimates obtained from hedonic wage models continues to be the subject of considerable debate, due in part to its remarkably large role in determining benefit-cost ratios for many federal policies (e.g., Ashenfelter and Greenstone, 2004 , Black et al., 2003 , Cameron, 2010 , Cropper et al., 2011 , Robinson, 2007 , U.S. EPA 2010 , U.S. OMB 2003 . For example, a recent review of the benefits and costs of 115 major federal regulations promulgated over the past decade, including health, transportation and environmental regulations, indicates that up to 70% of the total benefits across all rules considered are directly attributable to the monetized value of reducing early mortality (U.S. OMB 2013). These benefits are computed by multiplying the estimated number of lives saved as a result of the regulation by an agency's preferred point-estimate for the VSL.
The extant hedonic wage literature employs cross-sectional or panel data models, usually on national samples of workers, to estimate compensating wage differentials associated with increased occupational mortality risk and compute VSL estimates. 2 However, endogenous regressors and an inability to measure risks at the place of employment have plagued this literature. Occupational-risk measures have only been available as national averages that are aggregated by coarsely defined industry and occupation groups, and are thus subject to 1 To see how the VSL is computed, suppose there is a group of 100,000 individuals at risk of death from a particular exposure, and it is estimated that the average willingness to pay is $30 per year to reduce the risk of death by 1/100,000. The VSL in this context is equal to $30 x 100,000, or $3,000,000. The VSL does not measure the value of an identified life, but is instead an aggregate of the affected individuals' marginal willingness to pay for marginal reductions in risk. 2 Viscusi (1992) and Bockstael and McConnell (2007) provide a review of the theory and empirical approaches in the hedonic wage literature focused on estimating the VSL. Mrozek and Taylor (2002) , Viscusi and Aldy (2003) , Kochi et al. (2006) , and U.S. EPA (2010) provide quantitative reviews of the past empirical literature. considerable measurement error (Black, et al., 2003 , Black and Kniesner, 2003 , Scotton, 2013 . 3 In addition, unobserved worker and job characteristics are likely correlated with job risks and wages, biasing compensating wage estimates in an unknown direction (Black, et al., 2003 , Garen, 1988 , Scotton and Taylor, 2011 , Viscusi and Hersch, 2001 . To address this latter point, panel models following workers over time have been employed that control for unobserved worker characteristics (e.g., Kniesner et al., 2012 , Kniesner et al., 2010 . However, identification of the wage/risk premia relies in these panel models relies on individuals who change jobs to a different occupation and/or industry in order to change the associated job risks, thus not alleviating potential unobserved job characteristic confounders. VSL estimates from this literature vary from as little as $1 million to over $23 million (e.g., Kniesner, et al., 2012 , Kochi, 2011 .
We address important shortcomings of the existing empirical literature by employing a quasi-experimental design within a general labor-market context that closely mimics the data and framework of the traditional hedonic wage literature, but which credibly controls for endogeneity and reduces noise in the measurement of workplace risk. We overcome endogeneity and measurement error concerns by exploiting conditionally random manufacturing safety inspections conducted by the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to instrument for plant-level production worker risks (the workers most exposed). These surprise inspections are thorough, often taking multiple days, are highly visible to employees, and plants are required to correct safety violations within 30 days.
Follow-up inspections are conducted to ensure compliance and a tiered penalty structure imposing larger fines for repeat violations are used to prevent relapse.
Our results show that inspections reduce plant-level fatality risks by 3 Past studies have been particularly sensitive to inclusion of industry and occupation indicator variables leading some authors to question the existence of compensating wages for fatality risks on the basis that they are conflated with inter-industry wage differentials (e.g., Hintermann et al., 2010 , Leigh, 1995 . approximately 50 percent and that these reductions last through the entire study period. 4 Our data consists of a 10 year panel of confidential plant-level fatality, wage, and worksite characteristics data from OSHA and the U.S. Census Bureau. A complete census of U.S. manufacturing plants' employment data is collected by U.S. Census Bureau every five years and this data is coupled with a complete census of workplace inspections data and occupational fatality data maintained by OSHA. The panel nature of the data allows individual plants to be tracked over time in order to control for time-invariant worksite characteristics with the inclusion of plant-level fixed effects. Our instrumental variables (IV) estimators also include industry-specific time trends at the most disaggregated 4-digit SIC level thereby eliminating concerns of conflating inter-industry wage differentials with compensating wages for risk (Dorman and Hagstrom, 1998, Leigh, 1995) .
Results from our IV models indicate that post-inspection, production workers' wages are reduced by an average of two-to-three percent, suggesting a range for the VSL of $6 to $8 million. These results are robust to a variety of model and sample selection choices, which contrasts starkly with panel models we estimate using commonly employed national average risk rates or even uninstrumented plant-level risk rates. Another unique aspect of our data is that Census collects information on fringe benefit payments to production workers. We are thus able to estimate both direct and indirect payments to employees in exchange for increased job risks. Results suggest that fringe benefit payments account for as much as 35 percent of the compensating payments for workplace risks, increasing the VSL point-estimates to $8 to $10 million when included. Overall, our results reaffirm the existence of compensating wages for occupational risks as suggested by theory and explored empirically in the hedonic wage literature for over 40 years, and they support the use of $9 million as a reasonable point-estimate for the VSL in regulatory analysis. 5
The remainder of this paper is as follows. In the next section we provide a brief overview of OSHA practices for selecting plants for safety inspections that provides the natural experiment we wish to exploit. Section 2 presents an overview of the data and Section 3 presents estimates of the compensating wage differential associated with plant-level safety improvements. Section 3 also computes a range of point estimates for the VSL and offers several robustness tests for our estimation strategy. Section 4 offers conclusions.
I. The OSHA Inspection Process
OSHA was established under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 to set and enforce workplace safety standards. The majority of OSHA's funding over the past forty years has been devoted to enforcement of standards through workplace inspections (Fleming, 2001 , MacLaury, 1984 , Siskind, 1993 Plants with fewer than 11 employees and plants that received comprehensive inspections in the recent past were exempted. Although the definition of "recent past" for inspection varied between one and three years over our study period, the rules are well-documented for each year (1981, 1990, 1995) . Thus, programmed inspections during this period were to be randomly distributed among plants, conditioned on industry, plant size, state and recent inspection history according to OSHA policy. 8
In addition to programmed inspections, OSHA also conducts inspections that occur in response to events such as a complaint by an employee, a follow-up from jury accident rates that are 30% lower than states with state-administered programs. While we recognize that the sample is selected, it is not possible to incorporate state-administered OSHA programs because they are not required to disclose their scheduling processes publicly. 7 During a programmed inspection, an OSHA compliance officer reviews on-site plant-level records of historical injuries and illnesses, meets with employees, and inspects all aspects of a plant's physical operations that relate to safety or health. Upon completion of the inspection process, the compliance officer holds a closing conference with the employer, employees and/or the employees' representative to discuss any findings. 8 In years outside our study period, OSHA substantially changed its selection criteria, moving to a system that targeted plants based on past injury and illness incidence rates (Brooks1988, OSHA 2004 . Specifically, OSHA would randomly select plants to which it sent inspectors, but the inspectors would only decide on whether a full-inspection was conducted after reviewing the plant's injury logs. If the plant's reported injury rates were below the national average for all manufacturing, no inspection was conducted and plants knew this rule. Thus, while plants were still randomly selected to be visited, the decision to conduct an actual inspection was not random.
a previous inspection to ensure compliance, or in response to a serious accident at a plant that results in either a fatality or the hospitalization of three or more workers. While these types of inspections are not the focus of the analysis here, information from accident inspections are used to construct fatality rates at the plant level. Plants receiving an inspection for any of the reasons just noted are not included in the estimation sample since these inspections are not randomly assigned. This results in approximately 7% of plants being deleted from the sample.
II. Data
Our data are obtained from three sources. which is similar to the matching rate in other applications (e.g., Haviland, et al., 2010 , Walker, 2013 . There are a number of reasons for imperfect matches including ownership (name) changes, misreported or miscoded addresses, and plants using multiple addresses (e.g., the same plant may have an on-site delivery address, but use an off-site business office address for correspondence). 12
During the study period, there were just over 200,000 manufacturing plants in states that employed the federal OSHA inspection program. After linking the 10 We also estimate and report models dropping data from the ASM. 11 Details on the matching process are provided in the online appendix. 12 A less than perfect match rate between OSHA and Census data implies that the control group (uninspected plants) includes some inspected plants. We estimate that less than two percent of the control group would have been inspected at some point during the study period, but not identified as such by our matching. While this would bias our results away from finding an effect of OSHA inspections on safety and wages, as made clear in the results, we find robustly significant impacts. To explore this point further, we manually matched plants in seven industries with high risk rates and high initial match rates to decrease the potential for contamination of the control group. Results remain qualitatively the same for this restricted sample as for the full sample.
OSHA and Census data, there are two restrictions that reduce the number of plants used for estimation. First, plants with fewer than 11 employees are dropped from the sample since these plants are exempt from the OSHA programmed inspection process as just described. This reduces the sample by approximately 50 percent. Second, plants that received their first inspection prior to the start of the study period (1987) programmed inspection received at least one violation, and there were an average of 8.5 violations found per inspection. Although not reported in Table I , the proportion of inspections resulting in a violation increases to over 75% when 13 Plants are dropped whose injury logs were reviewed by OSHA prior to 1987 (regardless of whether or not the plant was actually inspected). As discussed in footnote 8, injury log reviews were randomly conducted by OSHA prior to 1987, thus ensuring randomization of the plants that are dropped from the sample based on their prior inspection history. Plants that receive a fatalityrelated inspection prior to being scheduled for a programmed inspection are dropped because inclusion of these plants in the treatment group may overstate the impact of programmed inspections on fatality rates due to regression to the mean. 14 NOTE TO REVIEWERS: The data reported in Table I are from publicly available OSHA and Census data and do not match our estimation samples because of confidentiality review requirements by the Census Bureau. We have been advised by Census that releasing summary statistics for preliminary samples can jeopardize our ability to release summary statistics for the samples upon which our final models are based. We will substitute the data that matches our estimation sample in the final version of the manuscript. considering only first time inspections. 15 The average annual fatality rate for the high-risk manufacturing industries targeted by OSHA for programmed inspections was 27.7 deaths per 100,000 workers, nearly five times the fatality rate for all manufacturing industries (6.1 deaths per 100,000 workers). Table I reports average annual plant-level wages and employment in 1997, which is the most recent COM wave used in the analysis. The average hourly wage rate for production workers was approximately $14 in 1997, or approximately $19 in 2016 dollars. 16 There was an average of 45 employees per plant, of which 72% were production workers. In addition to payroll and employment information, plant characteristics used in the analysis include total cost of materials, a measure of worker productivity calculated as the value of products shipped divided by production workers' total hours worked, and a proxy for worker turnover rates (see Table 1 
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III. Compensating Wage Differentials for Risky Working Conditions
The analysis focuses on randomized inspections as a treatment and assumes that post-inspection, all inspected plants are in compliance with safety rules because they were in compliance to begin with or because they make the changes required by law. The control group to which inspected plants are compared is all uninspected plants. On average, if there are compensating wages for dangerous working conditions as theory would suggest, then one would expect average wages of inspected plants to fall relative to the control group post inspection. It is not necessary for real wages to fall to identify the wage/risk tradeoff; only that wages rise less quickly at plants whose safety is improving as compared to plants whose safety levels remain unchanged.
The dynamic impacts of an OSHA programmed inspection on plant-level wages and safety are initially explored by constructing three event studies. First, production worker average real hourly wages at inspected plants and plants that have never been inspected are compared as follows:
where production worker average real hourly wages (1997$ Two trends emerge in Figure 1 . First, there is not a significant difference in wages at the 5% level between inspected and uninspected plants prior to a plant being inspected. This result again supports the assumption that OSHA is randomly selecting plants for programmed inspections conditioned on industry, state and year.
Second, real production worker wages at inspected plants decline relative to uninspected plants after a programmed inspection. There is some evidence that wages begin to adjust quickly post-inspection. Wage differentials between inspected and uninspected plants are statistically significant at the 5% level in years 2, 4, and 7
post-inspection and are significantly different at the 10% level in seven of the ten post-inspection years. Focusing on the period beginning two years postinspection, real hourly wages generally remain between 20 and 30 cents lower in inspected plants.
To explore the effects of OSHA inspections on plant safety, equation (1) Another way to explore safety impacts post-inspection is to examine the changes in the number of times a plant is found to be in violation of OSHA rules during an inspection. We take the number of violations found to be an indicator of safety conditions at a plant, and since found violations must be corrected, they are the mechanism by which changes in workplace safety conditions are expected to occur. The following model is estimated to explore how violations evolve over multiple inspections:
(2) , = + ∑ [ , = ] 10 =1
where all variables are as defined in equation (1) In sum, the event studies presented in Figures 1 through 3 suggest that inspected plants share a common trend in wages with uninspected plants prior to the inspection year and that there is a significant non-transitory reduction in both wages and workplace risks post-inspection. The event-studies lead us to adapt the fixed effects estimation strategies presented in equations (1) and (2) to an instrumental variables (IV) model that directly links compensating wages to fatality risks and compute a local average treatment effect for the industries targeted by OSHA.
Specifically, we estimate:
where the fatality rate (fatrate j,t ) at plant j in time t in equation (3) Unit. 17 The second stage regression in (4) regresses real average production worker wages at plant j in time t (wage j,t ) on predicted fatality rates, , , from (3) and all else is defined as for (3). Standard errors are clustered at the plant level for both (3) and (4).
The IV model is estimated using a sample of 65,300 plants (252,800 observations). Observations in the year of inspection and the year immediately following an inspection are dropped to allow sufficient time for wage adjustments to occur post-inspection (as is also suggested by figure 1). Models are reported later that explore the sensitivity of the results to the exclusion of these years. Kniesner, et al., 2012 , Kniesner, et al., 2010 , Scotton, 2013 , Scotton and Taylor, 2011 . However, changes in fringe benefits may be an important margin of adjustment for establishments that has not yet been explored and something we are able to do with our data.
Time-varying plant characteristics are excluded in some models out of concern that inspections may influence these variables as well, rendering these covariates "bad controls" (Angrist and Pischke, 2009 ). Lastly, we present models that are either unweighted or weighted by both the ASM survey weights and the number of production workers at a plant. The ASM weights are provided directly by U.S. Census Bureau, and address the oversampling of large establishments in ASM years. Weighting by the number of production workers addresses heteroscedasticity that may arise from using plant-level average wages and fatality rates.
Production worker weights are computed using the two-step procedure outlined in Dickens (1990) and Solon et al. (2015) that corrects for heteroscedasticity in the presence of both a clustered error component (plant identifier) and a group-size error component (number of production workers). 18 Total fringe compensation for all workers at a plant is reported in the COM. To estimate the total fringe compensation for production workers, we multiply total fringe compensation by the ratio of production worker wage payments to wage payments for all employees at each plant. (1993, 1990) find that OSHA inspections reduce nonfatal injury rates by 15 to 22 percent, roughly a half to a third of the impact suggested by our models. The divergence in our estimates may in part be driven by the fact that Scholz and Gray's estimates average over all OSHA inspections a plant has ever received, while our estimation strategy focuses on first-time inspections in which the most dangerous violations are likely to be found and corrected. As noted earlier in Figure 3 , the number of violations a plant receives during an inspection declines by nearly 70% in the second inspection, and remains low in all subsequent inspections indicating diminishing opportunities for repeated inspections to impact safety. 19 The complete set of coefficient estimates for the model presented in column 1 of Table II are reported in the online appendix. 20 Nonlinear poisson and negative binomial fatality count models were also estimated and suggest that programmed inspections result in a 56% reduction in plant-level fatalities, which is similar to the estimates reported for the linear IV models. Table II , Kniesner, et al., 2012 , Kniesner, et al., 2010 , Scotton, 2013 , Scotton and Taylor, 2011 . While our estimates are generally on the lower end of the current range, 95% confidence intervals overlap and the inclusion of fringe benefits increases the our point estimates closer to the average from the recent literature.
As indicated in
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A. Robustness and Additional Analysis
In this section, we explore potential threats to the validity of our estimation strategy by testing for general equilibrium effects of OSHA inspections on noninspected plants. We also present falsification tests using non-production worker wages as our outcome variable; explore the impact of OSHA inspections on factor productivity and employment levels; and estimate traditional hedonic wage models that mimic the approach in the extant VSL literature to which we compare our IV estimates.
To test for general equilibrium effects of OSHA inspections on plant-level risks, we examine spillovers among closely related plants using two approaches.
First, we define a related plant geographically and explore whether an OSHA inspection at one plant has spillover effects on the safety at other plants in the same by metropolitan statistical area (MSA) by estimating the following model:
where all variables are defined as in equation (3) A second way to consider spillover effects from OSHA inspections is to define related plants by their company ownership. Equation (5) is re-estimated replacing Related MSA j,t with an indicator variable, Related Firm j,t that is equal to one for all plants owned by the same parent company each year after the first plant owned by the parent company receives a federally programmed OSHA inspection, and equal to zero otherwise.
Key coefficient estimates for equation (5) are presented in the first column of Next, we present a falsification test that estimates the impact of OSHA inspections on wages of employees that are not production workers (e.g., clerical and management positions). Because non-production employees are less likely to be impacted by OSHA safety rules, we expect the wages of non-production workers to be unaffected by inspections. To test this assumption, the following model is estimated:
(6) ℎ , = + , + j,t × × + + , .
The dependent variable, Other Worker Wages, is obtained directly from the Census of Manufacturers and the Annual Survey of Manufacturers. The estimated key coefficient, , is presented in the first row of Table V (Model 1). Consistent with our expectations, we do not find a statistically significant impact of OSHA inspections on the wages of non-production workers.
Our IV estimator assumes that inspections result in costly safety improvements that lower plant wages, all else constant. To better understand the potential mechanisms underlying this assumption, we explore how plant employment levels, turnover rates and productivity are impacted by inspections. Table V also presents eight additional models that are identical to equation ( Changes in total factor productivity appear to be driven by labor productivity changes rather than capital adjustments since we find no significant impact of inspections on capital stock or cost of materials (models 4 and 5, respectively) but do find a significant impact on employment (models 6 through 8). Specifically, there is a significant increase in non-production workers post-inspection (model 6), which is consistent with additions of safety and process managers as one mechanism to reduce worker risks following OSHA inspections. There is also a proportionally similar increase in production workers post-inspection (model 7)
and thus no significant change in the share of total employees classified as pro-duction workers (model 8). 24 Finally, we find no significant impact of OSHA inspections on plant turnover rates (model 9), although our turnover measure is noisy since we only have total production worker counts each quarter and are only able to detect turnover when employees leave and are replaced in the same quarter.
Finally, we compare our IV estimates to standard hedonic wages models that employ commonly used national-average industry-specific risk rates (e.g., Evans
and Schaur, 2010 , Kniesner, et al., 2012 , Scotton, 2013 , Scotton and Taylor, 2011 , Viscusi, 2004 . Two traditional measures of industry-level fatality risks are constructed by aggregating production worker fatality and employee counts to either a two-digit SIC level representing industrial sectors or a more finely partitioned four-digit SIC industry classification. Both these measures are directly analogous to the national average risk rates typically employed in the extant hedonic wage literature. Although past studies typically pool across all types of workers, and so risks are also varied by broad occupational classes within each industry, one of these occupational classes is production workers and so our risk rates are directly analogous within the context of our specific sample of workers.
After constructing the more traditional fatality risk rates, the following hedonic wage equation is estimated using OLS:
where the natural log of real wages at plant j in year t are regressed on one of three risk rate measures: the two aggregate industry measures noted above, and uninstrumented plant-level fatality risk rates. A vector of plant-level characteristics, PC, are included as defined in equation (3), as are plant fixed effects, P j . We 24 In the simplest profit maximization formulation with convex safety provision costs and no workers' compensation requirements, employment would be expected to increase as safety improves. However, as Kniesner and Leeth (1991) and Bockstael and McConnell (2007) illustrate, when the theoretical model is slightly modified to accommodate workers' compensation, the relationship between plant employment levels and safety provision is theoretically ambiguous. also consider models in which plant-level fixed effects are replaced with industrysector fixed effects created at the two-digit SIC level.
Resulting VSL estimates from the estimation of equation (7) are presented in Table VI . In stark contrast to our IV estimates, the results are highly sensitive to model specification and often result in implausibly large (> $100 million) or exceptionally small (< $50,000) VSL estimates. The very small OLS estimates of the VSL based on plant-level fatality risks are consistent with classical measurement error highlighting the need for an IV approach even when data on plantspecific fatalities are available.
IV. Conclusions
This research provides quasi-experimental estimates of the VSL within a labormarket context as an alternative to traditional hedonic wage applications.
Notably, the research uses exogenous changes in risks at the place of employment that are an improved alternative to nationally aggregated risk measures that are typically used in hedonic wage applications. We are able to ameliorate concerns regarding omitted variable bias by employing randomly assigned OSHA inspections as an exogenous instrument affecting plant level safety. Our IV models suggest that workers' wages are reduced by approximately two percent after a comprehensive OSHA inspection is conducted, translating to VSL estimates between $6 and $8 million in 2016 dollars. 25 These results are robust to a variety of samples and model specifications. When considering responses in both wage and fringe benefits offered by the employer post-inspection, VSL 25 Recently, Kuminoff and Pope (2013) highlight that quasi-experimental applications in hedonic property value studies often estimate capitalization rates (differences in prices arising from movement between hedonic equilibria) under certain conditions rather than identifying marginal willingness to pay (MWTP) measures that are obtained from a single, stable hedonic rent gradient à la Rosen (1974) . Capitalization rates are equal to MWTP under the assumption that changes in the policy variable do not shift the hedonic price function. We expect plant-level OSHA inspections would not shift the labor market hedonic equilibrium given only six to seven percent of plants are inspected each year. Regardless of whether the hedonic wage function shifts, capitalization rates identify MWTP as long as the instrument is randomized, which is clearly the case with OSHA inspections during our study period.
estimates increase to $8 to $10 million, which is roughly in the mid-point of conventional cross-sectional or panel-data based hedonic wage models.
There are few other quasi-experimental studies to which we can compare our results. Within a transportation choice context, Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2004) and Leon and Miguel (2017) This is also a limitation of many hedonic wage samples focused mostly on male blue collar workers (e.g., Viscusi, 2004) . In addition, endogenous sorting of more productive workers into safer jobs will likely bias VSL estimates downward (Garen, 1988 , Hwang et al., 1992 . 29 ($1997) Average hourly wages of production workers in a plant; computed as the total annual payroll for production workers in a plant divided by total hours worked by production workers.
$13.91
Number of Employees
Average total employees per plant. 44.96
No. Production Workers
Average number of production workers [% of total employees].
[72%] Cost of Materials
Total cost of all materials consumed or put into production for the year, measured in $1997 millions.
$5.5
PW Productivity
Total value of all products shipped by a plant each year divided by total hours worked by production workers (PW) in that year ($1997).
$159.76
Single Unit Plant
Dummy variable equal to 1 for plants that are single unit establishment, and equal to 0 for multi-unit establishments.
82%
Turnover
Average decrease in production workers on payroll between quarters across the year as a percent of the average number of production workers employed that year. a Results for nine models are presented that are based on equation (6) and only vary by the dependent variable used in estimation. The coefficient estimates reported are for  in equation (6). Statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level are represented by ***, **, and *, respectively. All models use 252,800 observations (65,300 plants) and include plant and industry-by-state-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the plant level. Sample size is rounded to the nearest hundredth due to U.S. Census Bureau confidentiality requirements. (-4.26 -7.22) Annual average for the industry at the 4-digit SIC-level. (2) and (3) and summarized in Table I . 
